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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an 
unincorporated association that governs intercollegiate sports.  The NCAA 
supervises eighty-nine championships in twenty-three sports in which over 
400,000 student-athletes participate at more than 1000 colleges and 
universities.1  For 2011–2012, the NCAA announced audited revenues of 
$871.6 million.2  It is indisputable that the organization is the dominant force 
in the presentation and regulation of intercollegiate athletics.3  
Given its substantial market power, it should not be surprising that the 
 
 *  Leonard Cohen Professor of Law and Economics, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; 
Director, Loyola Sports Law Institute. 
 1.   Who We Are, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are+landing+page (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 2.  Revenue, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/ 
connect/public/ncaa/finances/revenue (last updated Feb. 13, 2013).  The NCAA disclosed that $705 
million of its total revenue came from a “rights agreement” with CBS Sports and Turner 
Broadcasting.  Id.  Most of the remaining revenue was received from ticket and merchandise sales at 
championship events.  Id.   Projected revenue for 2012–2013 is estimated to be $797 million, with 
$702 million attributable to a new rights agreement with CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting.  Id.  
 3.  Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust 
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 329 (2007). 
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NCAA is no stranger to federal antitrust litigation.4  Its rules, regulations, 
and practices have been challenged as illegal restraints on trade by 
universities, coaches, student-athletes, and other business entities with mixed 
results.5  Some commentators suggest the need for heightened antitrust 
scrutiny of NCAA business practices, while others argue for the passage of 
some form of antitrust exemption for NCAA activities. 
This Article focuses on the issues presented by the debate over granting 
the NCAA an exemption from federal antitrust law.  Part II briefly describes 
the history of antitrust litigation involving the NCAA.  Part III discusses 
some of the proposals for affording some type of antitrust immunity to the 
NCAA.  Part IV explains the rationales utilized for some of the numerous 
antitrust exemptions Congress and the Supreme Court have created for some 
businesses and forms of commercial activity.  Part V addresses the question 
of whether any of those rationales justifies providing the NCAA with a 
legislative or judicial antitrust exemption and concludes that the NCAA 
should not enjoy insulation from federal antitrust law.  Alternatively, if the 
NCAA does receive some sort of antitrust exemption, it should be predicated 
on the willingness of the member institutions to accept some form of 
regulatory oversight to ensure that the goals underlying any exemption will 
be sufficiently addressed. 
II.  THE NCAA’S ANTITRUST EXPERIENCE 
The NCAA has frequently been the target of federal antitrust claims, 
with mixed results.6  After initial success in fighting off antitrust claims, the 
NCAA suffered major defeats in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma7 and Law v. NCAA.8  Other litigation was settled.9  
 
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  For a discussion of many of the cases through 2008, see Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 329.  For 
a collection of the scholarly commentary on the antitrust issues, see id. at 353–54 n.116. 
 7.  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 8.  134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 9.  See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment).  This dispute involved NCAA rules 
that allegedly reduced competition from non-NCAA-sponsored postseason tournaments.  Id. at 548.  
The case was settled with an NCAA buyout of the National Invitation Tournament (NIT) for $56.5 
million (including legal fees).  Malcolm Moran, NCAA Buys NIT for $56.5 Million, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 17, 2005), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2005-08-17-ncaa-
nit-purchase_x.htm. 
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With respect to alleged anticompetitive restraints on student-athletes, 
however, courts continued to side with the NCAA when its amateurism rules 
were challenged.10  Courts either determined that federal antitrust laws did 
not apply to NCAA athletes who presumably were not actually involved in a 
commercial trade or business, or they found that the NCAA’s rules served 
the procompetitive objectives of competitive balance and preserving a clear 
line of demarcation between amateur and professional sports.11  
More recently, however, some courts have been increasingly receptive 
to the idea that NCAA football and basketball players may be sufficiently 
involved in commercial activity to warrant closer inspection of their antitrust 
claims.  In In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, non-
scholarship, walk-on football players challenged the NCAA’s limitations on 
the number of full grant-in-aid football scholarships.12  The court denied a 
motion to dismiss the complaint, recognized that financial aid to college 
students is commercial activity, and found that the alleged relevant market 
of “Division I-A football” was sufficient.13  It also concluded that the 
plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient “input” market in which NCAA schools 
compete for skilled amateur football players.14  While not a ruling on the 
merits of the controversy, the decision identifies the commercial nature of 
the relationship between NCAA athletes and the schools they attend.15  
Similarly, in White v. NCAA, a complaint by a plaintiff class of major 
college football and basketball players in the United States survived a 
motion to dismiss.16  The lawsuit challenged the NCAA’s grant-in-aid cap on 
financial awards to student-athletes.17  The court ruled that the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged that the NCAA had market power in relevant product 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 
459 (1999); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 
(5th Cir. 1988); Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 
2004); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 
(D. Mass. 1975). 
 11.  See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089–90 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 
F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983).   
 12.  398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
 13.  Id. at 1147–52.  
 14.  Id. at 1150.  After a denial of class certification, this case was settled on undisclosed terms.  
See Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 351 n.115. 
 15.  Id. at 1149.   
 16.  No. CV 06-999-RGK, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.ncaaclassaction.com/deny.pdf. 
 17.  Id. 
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and geographic markets and that harm to competition was adequately 
alleged.18  Class certification was subsequently granted and the NCAA 
settled for $10 million, also providing athletes easier access to $218 million 
of then-existing funds.19  While the case is of limited precedential value 
because of the settlement and the fact that the court merely upheld the claim 
on the pleadings, it nevertheless demonstrates more serious consideration of 
antitrust claims brought by NCAA athletes. 
More recent antitrust activity also suggests that the NCAA may have to 
defend more vigorously against claims asserted by student-athletes.  In 
Agnew v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit delivered a mixed message that gave 
the NCAA a victory, but simultaneously signaled potential antitrust 
liability.20  In Agnew, the court affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of a 
complaint by former college football players challenging NCAA rules 
limiting the number of scholarships and prohibiting multi-year scholarship 
awards.21  Judge Flaum concluded that the complaint failed to sufficiently 
identify a relevant commercial market and was therefore fatally flawed.22  
Nevertheless, the opinion suggested that there might be a relevant “labor 
market for student-athletes.”23  Judge Flaum noted that: 
 
 18.  Id. at 3. 
 19.  Jack Carey & Andy Gardiner, NCAA Agrees to $10M Settlement in Antitrust Lawsuit, USA 
TODAY (Jan. 30, 2008), http://usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-01-29-ncaa-settlement_N.htm.  
 20.  683 F.3d 328, 332, 335–38 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 21.  Id. at 332. 
 22.  Id. at 332, 345–47.  The court felt that the plaintiffs’ references in the complaint to a market 
for “bachelor’s degrees” and a market for “student-athlete labor” were insufficient because they 
were unclear and the complaint did not “adequately describe the relevant market on which the 
Bylaws may have had an anticompetitive effect.”  Id. at 345. 
 23.  Id. at 346.  Judge Flaum explained that “labor markets are cognizable under the Sherman 
Act,” and that “colleges do, in fact, compete for student athletes, though the price they pay involves 
in-kind benefits as opposed to cash.”  Id. at 346–47.  In an earlier opinion regarding NCAA 
restrictions on student-athletes, Judge Flaum argued that: 
The NCAA would have us believe that intercollegiate athletic contests are about spirit, 
competition, camaraderie, sportsmanship, hard work (which they certainly are) . . . and 
nothing else. . . . It is consoling to buy into these myths, for they remind us of a more 
innocent era—an era where recruiting scandals were virtually unknown, where 
amateurism was more a reality than an ideal, and where post-season bowl games were 
named for commodities, not corporations . . . .  [I]t is disquieting to think of college 
football as a business, of colleges as the purchasers of labor, and of athletes as the 
suppliers. 
  The NCAA continues to purvey . . . an outmoded image of intercollegiate sports that no 
longer jibes with reality.  The times have changed.  College football is a terrific American 
institution that generates abundant nonpecuniary benefits for players and fans, but it is 
also a vast commercial venture that yields substantial profits for colleges . . . .  An 
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[C]olleges may compete to hire the coach that will be best able to 
launch players from the NCAA to the National Football League, an 
attractive component for a prospective college football player.  
Colleges also engage in veritable arms races to provide top-of-the-
line training facilities which, in turn, are supposed to attract 
collegiate athletes.  Many future student-athletes also look to the 
strength of a college’s academic programs in deciding where to 
attend.  These are all part of the competitive market to attract 
student-athletes whose athletic labor can result in many benefits for 
a college, including economic gain.24 
The Agnew court’s recognition that the relationship between student-
athletes and their educational institutions is, at least in part, a commercial 
one is critical in deciding the applicability of the Sherman Act25 to some 
NCAA rules and regulations.26  Student-athletes promise to utilize their 
athletic skills on behalf of their schools in exchange for education, room, 
and board.27  “Thus, the transactions between NCAA schools and student-
athletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature, and therefore take place 
in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman Act.”28  Agnew arguably 
 
athlete’s participation offers all of the rewards that attend vigorous competition in 
organized sport, but it is also labor, labor for which the athlete is recompensed. 
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1098–99 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
 24.  Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347 (emphasis added). 
 25.  Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–
7 (2012)).  The Sherman Act was the federal government’s first attempt to “restore competition” 
through the prohibition of trade-controlling trusts.  Sherman Anti-trust Act (1890), OUR 
DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=51 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2013). 
 26.  See Justin M. Hannan, Comment, Antitrust Law—Seventh Circuit Sees Through Façade, 
Exposes NCAA Scholarship Limits to Sherman Antitrust Scrutiny—Agnew v. NCAA, 18 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 345, 350–56 (2013). 
 27.  Banks, 977 F.2d at 1095. 
 28.  Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341 (citing White v. NCAA, CV 06-999-RGK (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 
2006) (holding that colleges and universities compete for prospective student-athletes in the “Major 
College Football” market).  Interestingly, Judge Flaum does seem to support the notion that the 
NCAA may prohibit participation by student-athletes who receive cash payments beyond “the costs 
attendant to receiving an education—a rule that clearly protects amateurism.”  Id. at 343.  Frankly, 
once the court acknowledges that student-athletes exchange their sports participation for an 
education, it is not clear why capping compensation at the full cost of education is reasonably 
necessary to preserve some archaic notion of “amateurism.”  See, e.g., Kemper C. Powell, A Façade 
of Amateurism: An Examination of the NCAA Grant-in-Aid System Under the Sherman Act, 20 
SPORTS LAW. J. 241, 257–59 (2013).  The purity of the amateur ideal is already compromised by 
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further blurs any clear distinction for antitrust purposes between NCAA 
restraints in contexts other than student-athlete claims and other commercial 
transactions.29  No longer should courts assume that the Sherman Act cannot 
apply to anticompetitive restrictions on NCAA athletes.30  Rather, the 
argument grows stronger that student-athlete antitrust claims deserve 
consideration on their merits instead of summary disposition in favor of the 
NCAA.31  This may pose more antitrust problems for the NCAA in the 
future despite a victory in Agnew. 
In early 2013, the NCAA also defended against an Agnew-like antitrust 
claim in Rock v. NCAA.32  In Rock, plaintiffs challenged the same restraints 
that were the subject of the Agnew claim and additionally claimed that the 
NCAA ban on scholarships at Division III institutions constituted another 
antitrust violation.33  The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend 
and emphasized the antitrust requirement of pleading and proving the 
existence of a “relevant commercial market” and anticompetitive effects 
within that properly defined market.34  The court noted that Agnew 
recognized the existence of “a market of some sort” in the student-athlete–
university relationship.35  It also referred to Agnew’s distinction between 
“eligibility rules” and “financial aid rules,” and explained that Agnew 
concluded that eligibility rules should be entitled to a presumption of 
reasonableness in preserving “amateurism” while financial-aid rules do not 
merit such a presumption.36  Ultimately, the fatal flaw in the plaintiffs’ 
 
“paying” the students to be athletes.  Id. at 252–53.  The cost-of-education cap is arguably just 
another form of wage-fixing.  Id. 
 29.  See Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 350–52 (discussing the blurring of the dichotomous approach). 
 30.  Id. at 362.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1026–27 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (dismissing with prejudice 
the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the Division III scholarships with leave to file an amended 
complaint).  The court also dismissed Rock’s first amended complaint, giving him another 
opportunity to amend.  Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-CV-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 2304190, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. May 24, 2013).  Rock’s second amended complaint finally survived a motion to dismiss— 
the case is currently pending.  Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-CV-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at 
*1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013) (“This is the first time . . . that the [c]ourt concludes that the complaint 
at issue pleads the rough contours of a relevant market that is plausible on its face and in which 
anticompetitive effects . . . could be felt.”). 
 33.  Rock, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. 
 34.  Id. at 1017. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  Whether this attempted distinction between eligibility rules and financial aid rules is 
warranted in a sound antitrust analysis may fairly be questioned.  See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 345–46.  
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complaint was their vague and imprecise allegation of a nationwide student-
athlete labor market.37  The court properly noted that “NCAA schools are not 
necessarily adequate substitutes for each other” because although institutions 
“offering top-tier Division I football programs may be comparable 
substitutes, . . . it is implausible to suggest that lower-tier Division I football 
schools offer the same level of in-kind benefits (premier coaching, facilities, 
and national publicity).”38  In other words, “to lump all NCAA schools into 
the same market regardless of material distinctions in division, sport offered 
by gender, or athletic success proves that their proposed market is not legally 
cognizable.”39 
In O’Bannon v. NCAA, another case still pending, the court denied the 
NCAA’s motion to dismiss antitrust claims challenging a requirement that 
student-athletes relinquish all rights regarding commercial use of their 
images even after completion of their intercollegiate sports participation.40  
The complaint further alleged that the NCAA was able to use this 
requirement to enter into licensing agreements with companies that 
distribute products containing student-athletes’ images without any 
compensation to those student-athletes.41  The district court concluded that 
the NCAA member institutions’ joint agreement to the release rule was 
sufficient to satisfy the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and also determined that the complaint sufficiently alleged 
“significant anticompetitive effects” in a “collegiate licensing market.”42  
 
Because financial aid to the student-athlete is a form of “payment” for athletic performance, it is 
more obviously commercial in nature.  Id. at 341.  However, to the extent eligibility rules focus on 
limiting income to the student-athlete, they too may be viewed as commercial in nature.  In either 
context, the rules impact the extent to which college players may be compensated for their athletic 
endeavors.  
 37.  Rock, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 1022. 
 38.  Id. at 1021–22. 
 39.  Id. at 1022.  The court cites as an example of the overbreadth of the asserted market 
definition the obvious fact that the female gymnast and male football player are not in competition 
for the same scholarship on the same team.  Id.  Despite its conclusions about the inadequacy of the 
complaint regarding market definition, the court did grant leave to amend.  Id. at 1026–27. 
 40.  Nos. C 09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 8, 2010).  
 41.  Id. at *4. 
 42.  Id. at *13–14.  This case subsequently became a putative class action, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 5644656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 
2010). Subsequently, plaintiffs amended their complaint to narrow their proposed class definition, 
alter their damages theory, and identify two new markets in which competition had allegedly been 
restrained—“the Division I college education market” and the “market for the acquisition of group 
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Although the NCAA prevailed in Agnew and Rock and may ultimately 
achieve some sort of victory in the O’Bannon litigation, these cases do give 
support to the proposition that NCAA student-athletes are engaged in 
commercial activities.43  They are “selling” services to their institutions and 
“purchasing” an education—as well as athletic training and public exposure 
of their talents.44  Once courts acknowledge this reality, the antitrust laws 
should apply and the rule of reason may be used to determine the overall 
competitive impact of a particular NCAA rule or regulation.45  This would 
require that the plaintiff prove a relevant market and anticompetitive effects 
within the defined market.46  The NCAA could then attempt to demonstrate 
procompetitive virtues resulting from the challenged practice.47  This would 
include proving that the restraint in question actually promoted competitive 
balance or increased the quality of its product by maintaining a clear line of 
demarcation between professional sports and “amateur” intercollegiate 
athletics.48  If the NCAA successfully proffered proof of procompetitive 
justification, contemporary rule-of-reason principles would then allow 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that any legitimate goal could be furthered by 
 
licensing rights for the use of student-athletes’ names, images and likenesses in the broadcasts or 
rebroadcasts of Division I basketball and football games and in videogames featuring Division I 
basketball and football.” In re Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 
CW, 2013 WL 5778233 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25. 2013).  The Court found these allegations 
sufficient to state a Sherman Act claim and denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the third amended 
complaint. Id. at 6, 10. On November 8, 2013, Judge Wilkens certified a class of plaintiffs seeking 
injunctive relief but declined to certify a class seeking damages. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Litgation, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013).  This 
decision leaves the future of the O’Bannon case in some doubt, because the NCAA’s monetary 
exposure is significantly limited by the court’s decision on the damages class. Whether the case 
proceeds to trial or is settled remains to be seen. 
 43.  Hannan, supra note 26, at 335–57. 
 44.  For commentary on treating student-athletes as employees for labor law purposes, see 
Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 354 n.17.  See also Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible 
Labor Market: College Football and the Union Substitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077, 1136 
(referring to the NCAA as “an immense monopsony” and proposing a “limited form of player 
bargaining with the NCAA on subjects that are not inconsistent with NCAA rules and policies).  
Whether negotiations on matters that do not conflict with NCAA “rules and policies” will adequately 
address the concerns about economic exploitation of student-athletes is a question worth asking.  It 
may well be that those very “rules and policies” are at the core of the problem.  Id. 
 45.  See Hannan, supra note 26, at 335–57. 
 46.  Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures: The One-Year 
Rule and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Scrutiny, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 203, 
234–37 (2012). 
 47.  Id. at 237–40. 
 48.  Id. 
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substantially less restrictive means, thereby making the NCAA rule not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the stated procompetitive objective.49  The 
rule-of-reason journey is an arduous one, and it can generate considerable 
expense and substantial investment of time and money.50  The monetary 
risks are high, which may explain the willingness of the NCAA to settle 
antitrust cases it confidently predicts it would ultimately win.  In any event, 
in the absence of any legislative or judicial exemption from federal antitrust 
law, there is no reason to believe that the NCAA will enjoy any respite from 
continued antitrust challenges to its rules and regulations.  
III. ANTITRUST EXEMPTION PROPOSALS 
In 1961, the NCAA passed up a chance “to apply for an exemption . . . 
believing that was unnecessary because its ties to higher education would 
shield its rules from antitrust scrutiny.”51  More recent support for some form 
of antitrust exemption is attributable to a variety of sources.  Brian L. Porto 
argues for an NCAA antitrust exemption in a proposed “College Sports 
Legal Reform Act” that would exempt any NCAA commercial activity “as 
long as at least one principal purpose of any such action is educational.”52  
The statute would require due process for persons accused of violating 
NCAA rules.53  In 2008, the Women’s Sports Foundation suggested a 
limited antitrust exemption to restrain spending growth in the areas of 
coaches’ salaries and recruiting in men’s football and basketball.54  This 
 
 49.  See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58–62 (1910) (holding that under a “rule 
of reason” analysis restraints of trade that are “unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions” 
under the Sherman Act are unacceptable). 
 50.  See Gibson, supra note 46, at 240. 
 51.  BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA 19 (2012) (citing Welch Suggs, 
Football, Television, and the Supreme Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 9, 2004, at A32–A33).  
In 1991, U.S. Representative Tom McMillen (a former professional basketball player) introduced 
legislation in Congress to grant the NCAA a five-year antitrust exemption in exchange for NCAA 
reform regarding revenue sharing and due process for those accused of violations of NCAA rules.  
Id. at 17.  The bill, entitled the Collegiate Athletic Reform Act, would have also authorized the 
payment of a $300 per month stipend and five-year athletic scholarships for student-athletes in good 
academic standing.  Id.  The proposal failed to become law.  Id.  
 52.  Id. at 188. 
 53.  Id. at 188–90.  Currently, the NCAA is free from any requirement of providing due process 
(except as provided by its own rules) because it is not considered a state actor subject to the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 179–80 
(1988). 
 54.  See Erik Brady, Report: Group Wants Congress to Grant NCAA Anti-trust Exemption, USA 
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proposal was designed to free up more funding for women’s sports and 
“minor” men’s sports.55  Andrew Zimbalist, a noted sports economist, 
advocates a partial antitrust exemption to regulate coaches’ salaries, reduce 
the number of football scholarships, and replace the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS) system with a playoff.56  Len Elmore, a former NBA player, 
college basketball commentator, lawyer, and member of the Knight 
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, suggests that the NCAA receive a 
broad antitrust exemption so that it can mandate that revenues be utilized to 
“benefit the college or university as a whole and not simply the athletic 
department.”57  In 2012, a group of professors collectively titled “The 
Coalition On Intercollegiate Athletics” made a five-part recommendation to 
explore the possibility of an antitrust exemption to enable the NCAA to 
regulate spending on coaches’ salaries and other costs.58  The coalition 
recommended: (1) creating an antitrust exemption; (2) supporting a 
“collegiate model” of sports by lessening commercialism; (3) advocating 
policies to keep big football conferences inside the NCAA; (4) increasing 
efforts to respond to “reputational risks” derived from the “market driven 
model of sports;” and (5) cooperating with the NCAA to effect change while 
“remaining vigilant about NCCA efforts that place college sports over the 
academic missions” of higher education.59  More recently, concerns 
 
TODAY (Sept. 23, 2008), http://usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-09-23-foundation-report_N.htm. 
 55.  Id. 
 56. See Ray Melick, NCAA Hears Radical Proposal on How to Curb Athletic Spending, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Jan. 14, 2010), http://blog.al.com/ray-
melick/2010/01/ncaa_hears_radical_proposal_on.html.  A playoff system in college football is 
scheduled to begin in 2014.  See Heather Dinich, Playoff Plan to Run Through 2025, ESPN (June 
27, 2012, 1:12 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8099187/ncaa-presidents-
approve-four-team (explaining that a four-team playoff for college football was formally approved 
by a presidential oversight committee for the 2014 through 2025 seasons). 
 57.  See Len Elmore, Exempt the NCAA from Antitrust, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Exempt-the-NCAA-From-Antitrust/130073/. 
 58.  See Profs Consider Backing NCAA Antitrust Exemption, FOX NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/sports/2012/03/08/profs-consider-backing-ncaa-antitrust-exemption/. 
 59.  Id.  See also BRETT T. SMITH, SHOULD THE NCAA BE ABOVE THE LAW?: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE NCAA’S ANTITRUST STATUS (2010) (arguing for a limited antitrust exemption to regulate 
member institutions, but not a total exemption because of commercial aspects of the NCAA); Adam 
R. Schaefer, Slam Dunk: The Case for an NCAA Antitrust Exemption, 83 N.C. L. REV. 555, 567–68 
(2005) (concluding that NCAA needs “ample latitude” to fulfill its “critical role” in maintaining “a 
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports”).  Compare Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying 
College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-
start-paying-college-athletes.html (decrying “hypocrisy” in college sports and noting that college 
football and men’s basketball generate more than $6 billion in annual revenue). 
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regarding significant and ongoing realignment of athletic conferences are 
triggering calls for discussion of how the NCAA might be able to exert 
influence or control over the movement of schools from one league to 
another.60  Without any form of exemption, the NCAA is rightfully 
concerned that intervention might generate an antitrust suit reminiscent of 
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, where the 
Supreme Court invalidated the NCAA college football television plan.61 
A broadly drafted antitrust exemption for the NCAA could undoubtedly 
shield it and its members from any real threat of Sherman Act liability.62  
Even a more limited exemption would provide some relief from the steady 
stream of litigation, which creates expense and uncertainty about the validity 
of NCAA business practices.63  The critical question, however, is whether 
there is some public policy rationale sufficient to justify immunizing the 
NCAA from the normal application of legal principles designed to protect 
the competitive process and promote consumer welfare.64  The NCAA is an 
organization whose membership collectively controls intercollegiate sports.65  
Together the colleges and universities possess enormous market power in 
the sale of television rights for NCAA sports, the promotion and operation 
of tournaments, and a variety of other commercial aspects regarding the 
NCAA product.66  As a buyer, the NCAA functions as a “collusive 
 
 60.  Jeremy Fowler, Big 12 Voices NCAA Concerns to Mark Emmert, CBS SPORTS (May 30, 
2013), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jeremy-fowler/22328001/big-12-voices-ncaa 
-concerns-to-mark-emmert. 
 61.  468 U.S. 85 (1984).  See NCAA’s Emmert Urging Schools to Take Cautious Approach to 
Realignment, SPORTS BUSINESS DAILY (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/09/20/Colleges/NCAA.aspx (noting that 
NCAA president Mark Emmert has concerns about having a meeting regarding conference 
realignment); see also Michael Marot, Increase in Court Cases Could Impact NCAA Image, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 15, 2013), http://collegefootball.ap.org/article/increase-court-cases-could-
impact-ncaa-image (commenting on variety of lawsuits against the NCAA and how Emmert “has 
repeatedly avoided” stepping into the “turbulent whirlwind of conference realignment” because of 
legal concerns).  For an interesting and thorough discussion of the history and potential legal 
consequences of realignment, see generally Christian Dennie, Conference Realignment: From 
Backyard Brawls to Cash Cows, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 249 (2012) and Alfred Dennis Mathewson, 
The Bowl Championship Series, Conference Realignment and the Major College Football 
Oligopoly: Revolution Not Reform, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 321 (2012). 
 62.  See Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 370–71. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See, e.g., id. at 370 n.140. 
 65.  See Who We Are, supra note 1. 
 66.  As a seller of television rights to broadcast its major events, the NCAA also has considerable 
market power.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) 
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monopsonist,” since student-athletes, acting as sellers of their athletic talent, 
really have no reasonable alternatives to participation in an NCAA 
member’s program.67  The potential for anticompetitive consequences looms 
large.  Consequently, any antitrust exemption should be persuasively 
justified by strong countervailing policy arguments.  
IV. ANTITRUST EXEMPTION RATIONALES 
Exemptions from antitrust law may be derived either from congressional 
action (statutory exemptions) or judicial decisions (non-statutory 
exemptions).68  In 2007, the American Bar Association produced a 
comprehensive and detailed monograph reviewing the history of statutory 
exemptions from federal antitrust law.69  The monograph notes that “[m]ore 
than twenty federal statutory antitrust exemptions currently exist, touching 
upon widely differing aspects of commerce.”70  The most important section 
 
(concluding that the NCAA did have market power in the sale of television rights for college 
football, even though market power was not necessary in a case where output and price restraints 
created obvious anticompetitive effects). 
 67.  See In re NCAA I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 
(W.D. Wash. 2005); Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 351 n.115; LeRoy, supra note 44, at 1136.  
 68.  Non-statutory exemptions include the non-statutory labor exemption, designed to allow 
federal labor law to trump antitrust law and validate restraints contained in a collective bargaining 
agreement.  See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).  Other examples include the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which protects concerted efforts to petition government and the “state 
action” doctrine, which recognizes the right of sovereign states to regulate their local economies and 
authorizes private anticompetitive conduct subject to supervision.  For a discussion of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, see United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).   For a 
discussion of the “state action” doctrine, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  These latter 
doctrines represent judicial recognition of the need to reconcile federal antitrust statutory 
interpretation with constitutional principles.  This Article focuses only on statutory exemptions.  
Thus, citations of the numerous Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions, as well as 
scholarly commentary regarding the Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines, are omitted. 
 69.  See Federal Statutory Exemptions from Antitrust Law, 2007 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 
[hereinafter Monograph]. 
 70.  Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted).  Table 1 in Appendix A of the monograph presents a 
chronological listing of all statutory antitrust exemptions since 1914 and indicates which were still in 
existence at the time of publication.  The table lists forty statutory exemption enacted over a ninety-
year period, some of which have been repealed.  Id. at 319–22.  Table 2 lists statutory exemptions by 
industry, and the list indicates that exemptions have covered insurance, commercial transportation, 
agriculture, commercial fishing, labor, energy, foreign commerce, defense, professional sports, 
education, mass media and communications, retail or commercial food products, financial services, 
cooperative activities (research, production, and standard setting), health care, local government, 
charitable giving, and computer software.  Id. at 323–25. 
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of the monograph for purposes of this Article is its discussion of rationales 
for implementation of statutory antitrust exemptions.  Chapter III of the 
monograph presents an economic analysis of rationales for antitrust 
exemption or modification of antitrust principles falling “into three main 
categories: (1) [n]atural monopoly, (2) [m]arket and institutional failures of 
various kinds, or (3) [s]ubsidy for some socially desired activity or wealth 
transfer to some socially preferred group.”71  The natural monopoly rationale 
applies when only one firm can serve the market efficiently.72  Market or 
institutional failures can deal with achieving efficient scale, coordinating 
among competitors to create an efficient market, avoiding destructive or 
ruinous competition, balancing asymmetric bargaining power to facilitate 
efficiency, mitigating prior failures in market regulation, and creating market 
power to subsidize social goals (including subsidization of a favored activity 
and wealth transfer to a favored class of market participants).73 
In professional sports, there are two prominent examples of a statutory 
antitrust exemption: the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act74 and the 1966 
Professional Football League Merger Act (amending the 1961 statute).75  
The Sports Broadcasting Act exempted joint television broadcast agreements 
when rights were sold for sponsored telecasts of the games.76  The 1966 
amendment to the statute authorized the merger between the National 
Football League (NFL) and the American Football League (AFL).77  In 
education, Congress has created antitrust exemptions by enacting the Need-
Based Educational Aid Act,78 which permits colleges and universities to 
share student financial aid information under certain guidelines.79  
Institutions that admit students on a “need-blind” basis may agree to award 
 
 71.  Id. at 53. 
 72.  Id. at 53–56. 
 73.  Id. at 56–81. 
 74.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95 (2012).  
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. § 1291. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  The original enactment 
contained a sunset provision that terminated the exemption on September 30, 1997.  The Need-
Based Educational Aid Antitrust Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-43, § 1, 111 Stat. 1140, 
extended the exemption to 2001.  The Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-72, 
115 Stat. 648, subsequently extended the expiration to September 30, 2008, and the Need-Based 
Educational Aid Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-327, 122 Stat. 3566, further extended it to September 30, 
2015. 
 79.  15 U.S.C. §1. 
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financial aid based only on demonstrated financial need.80  To do so, these 
institutions may use common analysis principles to determine need and a 
common financial aid application form to exchange data about the assets, 
income, expenses, and related information about the student and the 
student’s family.81  The statute specifically prohibits “any contract, 
combination, or conspiracy with respect to the amount or terms of any 
prospective financial aid award to a specific individual.”82  Further, in 2004, 
Congress created a specific retroactive exemption for graduate medical-
student resident-matching programs.83   Prior to enactment, antitrust claims 
alleged that the matching program artificially depressed salaries and benefits 
for medical residents.84  The NCAA regulates in an area that involves both 
education and athletics, so it may be useful to examine the rationales for 
these exemptions and determine whether they have promoted important 
policy objectives. 
None of these exemptions provide for a complete insulation of the 
protected parties from antitrust laws.  The NFL exemptions are limited to 
television broadcasting and the merger of the old AFL with the NFL.85  
Antitrust lawsuits against the league and its teams in other areas of 
commercial activity were litigated after the passage of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act and the Professional Football League Merger Act.86  The 
Need-Based Financial Aid Act is carefully tailored to allow information 
exchanges but not to endorse any actual tuition or financial aid agreements 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  The statute provides that individual financial aid officers at each institution must retain 
“independent professional judgment” with respect to individual applicants.  Id.  The information 
exchange is conditioned on institutions being permitted to retrieve data only once with respect to 
each student.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident Matching Programs, 15 
U.S.C. § 37b (2012) (permitting use of a “computerized mathematical algorithm . . . to analyze 
preferences of students and residency programs [to] match students with their highest preferences”). 
 84.  See Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d 184 F. 
App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 37b(a)(1)(E)) (“Antitrust lawsuits challenging the 
matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to undermine this 
highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process.”). 
 85.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 86.  For a discussion of some of these cases, see Drew D. Krause, Comment, The National 
Football League’s Ban on Corporate Ownership: Violating Antitrust to Preserve Traditional 
Ownership—Implications Arising from William H. Sullivan’s Antitrust Suit, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT 
L. 175, 186 n.64 (1992). 
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among schools that would amount to a form of price-fixing.87  The 
exemption for medical resident-matching programs is also narrowly limited 
to the needs of teaching hospitals and specifically excludes agreements 
between two or more graduate medical education programs to “fix the 
amount of the stipend or other benefits received by students participating in 
such programs.”88  
The NCAA restraints that are often the subject of antitrust claims 
involve both athletic and educational pursuits.89  Thus, it is useful to 
determine whether the rationales underlying the foregoing statutory 
exemptions lend any support to calls for exempting NCAA activities from 
federal antitrust law.  Some of the calls for granting the NCAA an antitrust 
exemption suggest that it would enable schools to spend more money on 
women’s sports and minor men’s sports that do not generate much, if any, 
revenue.90  In essence, this would fall within the category of exemption 
rationales that subsidize or favor a particular group or activity.  Arguably, 
the rationale underlying the financial aid statute is that it will expand 
educational opportunities to a wider array of applicants.91  The Sports 
Broadcasting Act was “rendered largely obsolete by changing economic 
circumstances and changing judicial application of antitrust law.”92  When 
first enacted, it was designed to foster competitive balance and also ensure 
that viewers of professional football would find it “accessible through the 
lowest cost means to the general public.”93  The authorization of the NFL–
AFL merger was, in part, justified by the notion that the merger would 
 
 87.  See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 88.  15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(3). 
 89.  See Gibson, supra note 46, at 220–21. 
 90.  See Brady, supra note 54. 
 91.  The statute has been criticized for failing to further the goal of making higher education 
more affordable.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-963, HIGHER EDUCATION: 
SCHOOL’S USE OF THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED COLLEGE 
AFFORDABILITY OR LIKELIHOOD OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT TO DATE 1–2 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-963. 
 92.  Monograph, supra note 69, at 217.  Bundling of league broadcasting rights is more common 
and “now may well be lawful restraints of competition.”  Id. at 218.   See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (noting that sports leagues may need to cooperate to promote 
competitive balance and pursue other procompetitive goals and that a rule-of-reason analysis is 
appropriate for restraints accompanying the joint venture). 
 93.  Monograph, supra note 69, at 228–29.  Interestingly, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s 
television plan for college football, resulting in an increased supply of games and declining revenue 
based on the forces of renewed competition.  
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increase the total number of professional football teams.94  
The statutory exemption in the educational context does not condone or 
protect any fixing of tuition or financial aid by schools seeking shelter from 
antitrust liability.95  The graduate medical school exemption offers no 
immunity to the actual fixing of salaries and benefits by teaching hospitals.96  
Neither statute would be analogous to the alleged fixing of student-athlete 
“compensation” for their “labor” as college basketball or football players. If 
a federal court were to recognize the players as suppliers of services and the 
NCAA schools as buyers of their labor, the foregoing exemptions would not 
really provide a good model for antitrust immunity because they steer clear 
of actually fixing any price or wage.  In sum, existing antitrust exemptions in 
the sports and educational contexts do not afford across-the-board immunity 
for potential antitrust defendants.  
Most of the other statutory antitrust exemptions involve neither 
academics nor athletics.  They cover a broad range of commercial activity.97  
One common thread that runs through much of this legislation is that it 
protects businesses that lack market power and allows them to act 
collectively to compete with larger entities or to offset power by businesses 
with which they deal.98  In other cases, the exemption is designed to promote 
and enhance efficient markets.  Frequently, the creation of antitrust 
protection is conditioned on the imposition of governmental regulation to 
protect the consuming public from economic exploitation.99  Uncertainty 
arises regarding the scope of these exemptions and whether they may have 
 
 94.  Monograph, supra note 69, at 229 n.48.  There was also concern that the NFL–AFL rivalry 
could “imperil the entire industry.”  Id. at 229–30. 
 95.  See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665–66 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Nonprofit 
organizations are not beyond the purview of the Sherman Act, because the absence of profit is no 
guarantee than an entity will act in the best interest of consumers.”) 
 96.  See Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d 184 F. 
App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 97.  See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 98.  See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 99.  See, e.g., Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to 
Deregulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761, 782–83 (discussing express antitrust immunity for 
“business of insurance” and noting uncertainty about the degree of regulation required); Maurice E. 
Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 524 nn.285–95 (collecting various 
statutory antitrust exemptions, some of which include government oversight of private conduct); 
Christine A. Varney, The Capper–Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives, and Antitrust Immunity, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2010) (noting that antitrust exemption for farming cooperatives creates a 
“countervailing” power for small sellers and promotes efficiency). 
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outlived their usefulness.100  These countervailing concerns require an 
answer to the question of whether any exemption for the NCAA fits within 
any of these rationales and merits serious consideration. 
V.  ANTITRUST EXEMPTION RATIONALES AND THE NCAA 
The $64,000 question101 is reduced to this: does any acceptable rationale 
for a legislative antitrust exemption really further the case for giving one to 
the NCAA?  I think not.  The NCAA is not a small operator in a market 
inhabited by larger entities.102  It does not lack market power or the ability to 
negotiate in commercial transactions.103  The NCAA is the dominant player 
in intercollegiate athletics, possessing great bargaining power in purchasing 
the raw ingredients for and selling its athletic product.104  The only plausible 
explanation for granting the NCAA and its member institutions an antitrust 
exemption might be to further the goal of expanding opportunities for 
student-athletes regardless of whether their sports generate “profit” or 
“surplus” for their institutions.105  However, Title IX106 has been a useful tool 
for ensuring gender equality in NCAA sports and the NCAA itself requires 
that schools have a minimum number of men’s and women’s sports to 
qualify for Division I athletics.  Any antitrust exemption that allows colleges 
and universities to limit coaches’ salaries simply creates a questionable 
wealth transfer and inhibits competition for skilled teachers of athletic skills 
 
 100.  See Bush, supra note 99, at 782.  
 101.  This is a reference to the scandal-plagued television quiz show from the 1950s.  The term 
“$64,000 question” refers to the “big money” question on the show.  It may be thought of as the 
ancestor of the $1 million question on “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” 
 102.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 103.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 105.  See Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 370 n.140. 
 106.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex 
discrimination in “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).  This legislation was strengthened by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987, which legislatively overruled case law limiting Title IX to circumstances where athletic 
departments at educational institutions directly received federal money.  20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012).  
Current regulations promulgated by the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education to 
enforce Title IX are designed to promote equality in financial assistance.  See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 
(2007) (discussing financial assistance); id. § 106.41(c) (addressing equal opportunity).  Section 
106.37(a) specifically prohibits providing “different amounts or types of such assistance” based on 
sex, and section 106.37(c) requires that “reasonable opportunities” be made available for members 
of each sex to receive scholarships “in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating 
in [sports].” 
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and tactics.107  Arguably, the continued “cap” on economic benefits to 
student-athletes also suppresses competition for their “labor.”108  Providing 
this wealth transfer legal protection from federal antitrust law is 
unjustifiable, particularly if there is no assurance that the institutions would 
invest the funds in increased athletic opportunities for those participating in 
non-revenue sports.109 
Although the NCAA has generally been successful in repelling antitrust 
challenges to its amateurism rules, the pending O’Bannon class action and 
language in other cases suggests that tide may turn.  An antitrust exemption 
would perpetuate what many feel is exploitation of college athletes, 
particularly in football and basketball.110  In sum, any blanket exemption for 
the NCAA would allow colleges and universities to keep money that a 
competitive market would put in the pockets of others.111  One might call the 
result a “reverse Robin Hood effect,” where the rich get richer and the have-
nots continue to struggle.112  
One alternative to any across-the-board exemption would be creating 
immunity subject to independent regulatory oversight.  At least in this 
scenario the NCAA would not be able to act solely in its own economic 
interest.  Rather, a regulator could function as an “honest broker” to ensure 
equitable treatment of those who deal with NCAA in a commercial context.  
Some commentators have argued for an exemption conditioned upon the 
NCAA giving “due process” to those accused of rule violations.113  While 
this is a useful contribution, it falls far short of the mark.  Protecting 
individuals and institutions from NCAA overreaching and using 
questionable investigative tactics is a valid regulatory goal, but it does not 
address the anticompetitive consequences of NCAA conduct that are alleged 
to restrain trade.  Any antitrust exemption should provide oversight to 
address the commercial aspects of NCAA activity. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to articulate just what agency or oversight 
body would be capable of taking on the enormous task resulting from my 
 
 107.  See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998) 
 108.  See Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 336. 
 109.  See Lazaroff, supra note 3, at 336 n.130. 
 110.  See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The College Sports Cartel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/nocera-the-college-sports-cartel.html. 
 111.  See Joe Nocera, The Plot to Rule College Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/opinion/nocera-the-plot-to-rule-college-sports.html. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See PORTO, supra note 51, at 178–96. 
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alternative proposal.  The ABA’s monograph on antitrust law exemptions is 
not optimistic about the prospect of adequate supervision or oversight as a 
general matter.114  In the end, however, the monograph’s suspicion about the 
validity of most antitrust exemptions suggests that the optimal approach 
would be to disallow the exemption. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Sherman Act’s rule of reason is adequate to consider the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of NCAA-imposed restraints.  
Although antitrust litigation is both expensive and time-consuming, it 
permits a full airing of the competitive consequences of particular trade 
restraints.  The NCAA has been successful in defending some of its 
commercial practices, and it has also suffered some significant defeats.115  
The debate about the application of substantive antitrust principles to 
student-athletes’ claims is currently front and center.  The federal courts 
should be permitted to hear these cases and make determinations on their 
merits.  Although the players have suffered some setbacks in recent cases, 
the clamor for treating them more like employees and less like true amateur 
competitors continues to escalate.  
Perhaps student-athletes will be permitted to unionize by the National 
Labor Relations Board, in which case the non-statutory labor exemption will 
come into play.  Perhaps the matter will be settled in litigation.  Courts could 
conclude that goals like competitive balance or maintaining a clear line of 
demarcation between professional and amateur sports justify the challenged 
restrictions.  Alternatively, judges might decide that these rationales are not 
actually furthered by the restraints in question and conclude that the 
Sherman Act has been violated.  Perhaps the NCAA will eliminate or amend 
some of its rules and regulations to render them less objectionable to 
potential antitrust plaintiffs and fend off lawsuits.  
In any event, granting a blanket antitrust exemption to the NCAA, 
 
 114.  See Monograph, supra note 69, at 303 (“[W]hen Congress removes antitrust law standards 
for some particular conduct, the situation will usually call for alternative oversight, usually by a 
government entity.  However, the creation of new agencies and new regulatory roles for existing 
agencies seems politically infeasible for the time being.”).  This monograph was published in 2007, 
so its skepticism that any new regulatory bodies would be formed in the absence of a genuine crisis 
might be less justified.  Given the gridlock in the federal government, however, the concerns 
expressed may still be quite valid.  
 115.  See supra Part II. 
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without the farmer watching the henhouse, would be the equivalent of 
leaving the fox free to devour its prey.  Until and unless a sufficient 
regulatory scheme is devised to ensure that any commercial restraints on 
coaches’ salaries and player “compensation” would serve sound policy goals 
and expand overall athletic opportunities, application of Sherman Act 
principles by the courts is a better alternative than blanket immunity.  
Letting the fowl live is fair! 
